Laura Damone Wrote:Hi there, so sorry for the embarrassingly-long delay here.
B isn't wrong because it says "some" and not "all." True, if we bestowed rights on all living things, we would inherently bestow them on all plants, not just some plants. But since "some" is of a lesser degree than "all," when "all" would be accurate, "some" is also accurate. For example, all users of our forums use the forums online. That's a true story. But it's also correct to say that some forum users use the forums online. That's a true story too. It's not the whole story, but it's a true story nonetheless. MANY correct answers to tough Must Be True questions will be like this: they'll say something that must be true, even though it doesn't paint a complete picture of everything that must be true based on that stimulus.
Ok, so if B isn't wrong because of the "some," why is it wrong? Because it only deals with one of the two scenarios presented in the stimulus. The stimulus tells us that if we construe the term "living things" broadly, then we'll end up counting plants. But if we construe the term "living things" narrowly, we might miss some organisms that are biologically considered animals. In this scenario, plants might not make the cut either. That's why B is wrong.
D, on the other hand, addresses both scenarios. If we want to establish rights for all animals, then we can't go with the narrow construction scenario. That means either we're either construing "living things" broadly and giving rights to plants, or we're using a different framework instead of, or in addition to, the "living thing" requirement.
Hope this helps!
So you're saying that (D) entertains yet a third option ("using a different framework") that is not mentioned in the stimulus?
I didn't know that was allowed on a question of this type, as the answers on these questions seem to limit themselves quite strictly to the terms set down in the stimulus. So if the stimulus of an inference question says "John doesn't like apples and John doesn't like oranges" the correct answer couldn't be "But John likes bananas."
It also seemed to me that, because of the fundamental "great difficulties" described in the stimulus, it would be inherently impossible to describe an effort to establish animal rights as definitively "successful"—because even if you used a different set of criteria someone could always shift the terms of those criteria to include more or fewer organisms. That was, vaguely, part of my answer-choice anticipation, and it's what (C) vaguely resembled to me.
How do we assess "success" in animal-rights assignment, and how could we trust that such an assessment is, in fact, successful? The stimulus mentions neither success nor the means for defining and assessing it, so its appearance in (D) appeared like quite a leap. Who is the arbiter of success in determining and assigning animal rights? Does (D) assume a UN animal-rights authority whose word on these matters is final? And in successfully assigning those rights, what method and criteria were used, and why are they better than the method and criteria described in the stimulus? How does that method solve the fundamental problem of inclusion-exclusion described in the stimulus?
Without the answers to those questions, it's impossible to begin to know what "successful" in the realm of animal rights would look like, let alone to infer what such attempts are more or less likely to do.