ohthatpatrick Wrote:It DOES seem like some element of a causal flaw is present, but I think the real problem is that the evidence is not a correlation.
Raw numbers do not constitute correlations. LIKELIHOODS do.
If I say "there are more prisoners in Texas than in Delaware", that's not actually a correlation.
I'm not saying
"people who live in Texas are more likely to be prisoners than are people who live in Delaware"
You can assess the danger of something without assigning specific causality, even though that feels kinda like an oxymoron.
If I say 10% of people who travel to Russia get robbed while only 5% of people who travel to Spain get robbed, and then I conclude that it is therefore more dangerous to travel to Russia, then it certainly feels like I'm causally blaming some aspect of Russia.
After all, if I thought "People who are more likely to get robbed prefer traveling to Russia to traveling to Spain", then I wouldn't have said that "travel to Russia is more dangerous". I would have been chalking up the causality between the 10% vs. 5% to the travelers, not the destinations.
So I feel like I agree that the conclusion implies some level of causality.
This might be a rare case where (E) is a superior answer because the stem asks how the argument is MOST vulnerable to criticism.
Before we can even GET to the error that (B) would be describing, we have to first get past the confused thinking that (E) is describing.
IF WE GRANTED THE AUTHOR that a higher PERCENTAGE of people were killed crossing with the light, THEN we could argue what (B) is arguing in terms of how to explain that statistic.
But (E) is shutting down the argument farther upstream: dude, you haven't even convinced me yet that people are more likely to be killed crossing with the light.
I agree with much of what you are saying Patrick and I don’t claim to be the expert to know casuation enough to the point I can definitively conclude whether or not or how much this Q has causality elements. However, I do feel like your analogy while good in spirit might be just a tiny bit off in analogizing the stimulus. I agree that there is no correlation implied in the numbber of prisoners in Texas vs that of Delaware, but that’s only bc the super set is humongous — there are hundreds if not thousands of prisons nationwide so simply one specific location (Texas) has a higher number does seem not imply a correlation. But the case in our stimulus is just a binary cut, that “either crossing with or against the lights”. There aren’t hundreds or thousands of different ways of crossing the light in which case your prisoner analogy would be more anaylogizing in my opinion. And if there are only “two” ways of doing a thing, and one of which has a higher number in a consequence, idk, it does seem suggest a weak correlation there. At least for me, when I read your analogy, i was like, oh yeah, totally agree, there is no correlation there. But when I read the stimulus, I get a different feeling. And after analyzing why, this is what I come up with. So personally, I do think there might be a slight correlation in the evidence but the conclusion isn’t committing a causation flaw. Instead, the conclusion is saying bc a higher “number” in something therefore a higher “likelihood” of risk/danger in that thing, which is in complete conformity with the rest of your analysis.