by rinagoldfield Fri Jul 12, 2013 4:49 pm
Hey yli.angela,
Thanks for your post. Very tricky question!
(C) is really tempting. I see what you’re saying about how (C) seems to connect to the notion that legal opinions are "...responsive to and informed by the conditions, constraints, and aspirations of the world in which the new legal problem has arisen."
But we need to situate those lines in the bigger context of what the Law and Literature movement is all about. In the third paragraph, the author outlines the Law and Literature movement’s big point: legal opinions are "like artistic performances" in that "each judicial opinion attempts in its own way to promote a particular political or ethical value" (lines 44-47).
In "re-constituting" old legal texts to be responsive to the "conditions, constraints, and aspirations of the [modern] world," the judge must turn to necessarily subjective "political" and "ethical" values. Legal opinions thus derive from the particular political and ethical inclinations of the judge, just as works of literature derive from the particular aesthetic inclinations of the artist.
(D) is supported because "each judicial opinion" "translates" old legal texts according to "particular" values. Different judges will bring different values to bear on their opinions.
(C) is unsupported because the judge doesn’t objectively mediate between old legal texts and new legal challenges. Rather, the judge creates an "artistic" "translation."
(A) is contradicted. The Law and Literature movement is a new theoretical development, so its proponents probably don’t think that theoretical developments undermine the law.
(B) is out of scope. No specific claims about conservative judges are made.
(E) is also really tempting, I think! But the Law and Literature movement is about how judicial opinions reflect particular "values," not particular "theories of jurisprudence."
Does that make sense? Hope it helps.